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LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: FROM SKEPTICISM 
TO VALUE THEORY
L e s l i e  P ic k e r in g  F r a n c i s *
I. I n t r o d u c t io n : L a w  a n d  P h il o so ph y
To w rite about philosophy and  law  is b o th  odd and  daunting. I t  is 
odd because the  topic seems to  presuppose th a t the  tw o fields are  sepa­
ra te  and  th a t philosophy m ay be unfam iliar to  legal practice and  legal 
practitioners. Y et, recognized o r not, philosophy is p a rt o f the  ordinary  
life o f law  schools and  lawyers. Im ages o f th e  m ethods o f  philosophy 
shape accounts o f legal education and  legal reasoning. C onstitu tional de­
cisions w restle w ith  great philosophical issues: liberty, the  m arketplace, 
rights, justice. A nd  constitutional consensus changes along w ith  dom i­
n an t philosophical views. S talw art philosophical topics sit firm ly on the  
legal landscape: free will and  responsibility, duress, causation, intention- 
ality, paternalism , and  m yriad  others. Perhaps the  m ost fundam ental di­
vision am ong basic theories about the  na tu re  o f  law  is w hether the  very 
concept o f law  presupposes connections to  m orality  o r to  political 
philosophy.
T he topic is daunting because it  can be taken in  so m any directions. 
Philosophy itself is n o t a  single m ethod o r discipline o r topic o r tradition, 
n o r even a  recognizably lim ited set o f  m ethods o r disciplines o r topics o r 
traditions. Literally, philosophy is the  love o f  w isdom. Philosophers ask 
questions, clarify meaning, and  search for understanding. T he practice 
o f philosophy m ay appear pretentious, as in  A ristophanes’s caricature o f 
Socrates in  T h e  C lo u d s j1 politically powerful, as in  John  Locke’s critique 
o f the  divine righ t o f kings;2 inspiring, as in  St. Bonaventure’s T h e  M in d ’s  
R o a d  to  G o d ;3 o r deadly serious, as in  contem porary bioethical discus­
sions o f  health  care rationing o r th e  righ t to  die. Traditional, central 
areas o f  philosophical inquiry were: epistemology, o r the  study o f the
* Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Utah; B.A., 
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1. A ristophanes, The C louds, reprinted in 2 T he C om plete G reek  D ram a 541 
(Whitney J. Oates & Eugene O’Neill, Jr. eds., 1938).
2. See John Locke, Two T rea tises  o f G overnm ent (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 
1988) (3d ed. 1698).
3. Saint Bonaventure, The Mind’s Road to God (George Boas trans., Liberal Arts 
Press 1953).
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natu re  and  possibility o f  knowledge; m etaphysics and  ontology, o r the  
study o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  the  w orld a t its m ost fundam ental level, including 
th e  n a tu re  o f  being; and  ethics and  politics, o r  the  study o f w hat is good 
and  rig h t for individuals o r  societies. Philosophy has also spawned o ther 
disciplines, now  developed in  the ir own right: psychology, form al se­
m antics, and  artificial intelligence.4 T oday philosophers are  deeply in­
volved in  the  questions o f o the r disciplines: bioethics, professional ethics, 
philosophy o f psychology, philosophy o f physics, and  philosophy o f his­
tory , to  nam e a  few.
These relationships between philosophy and  law  have developed 
along m any different lines. F ro m  the  P latonic dialogues to  nineteenth- 
century  A m erican pragm atism  and  beyond, philosophical w ork has influ­
enced the  historical developm ent o f  law .5 Philosophical structures and 
m ethods o f argum ent, such as the  syllogism o r the  argum ent from  anal­
ogy, are  im portan t tools o f  legal reasoning.6 Philosophical topics appear 
as problem s w ithin law: Some o f the  best analytic philosophy in B ritain 
in  the  1950s and  1960s was devoted to  im portan t legal topics, such as 
H .L .A . H a rt and  A .M . H onore’s analysis o f the  concept o f legal causa­
tion,7 o r  J.L . A ustin ’s discussion o f  excuses.8 Philosophical analysis o f 
these and  o ther legal problem s continues today.9
O n th e  m ost abstract level, highly developed philosophical accounts 
have been given o f  the  na tu re  o f law  itself. These range from  traditional
4. J.L. A ustin , Ifs and Cans, in P h ilosoph ica l Papers 205 (J.O. Urmson & G J. War- 
nock eds., 3d ed. 1979).
In the history of human inquiry, philosophy has the place of the initial central sun, 
seminal and tumultuous: from time to time it throws off some portion of itself to 
take station as a science, a planet, cool and well regulated, progressing steadily to­
wards a distant final state. This happened long ago at the birth of mathematics, and 
again at the birth of physics: only in the last century we have witnessed the same 
process once again, slow and at the time almost imperceptible, in the birth of the 
science of mathematical logic, through the joint labours of philosophers and mathe­
maticians. Is it not possible that the next century may see the birth, through the joint 
labours of philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other students of language, of a 
true and comprehensive science o f  language? Then we shall have rid ourselves of one 
more part of philosophy (there will still be plenty left) in the only way we ever can 
get rid of philosophy, by kicking it upstairs.
Id, at 232.
5. One recent American study is Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law, 1870-1960 (1992).
6. K g Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 H arv . L. Rev. 741 (1993). 
Sunstein’s article is an illustration of how philosophical techniques can be put to work in the 
study of legal reasoning.
7. H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law (1962).
8. J.L. A ustin , A Plea for Excuses, in P h ilosophical Papers, supra note 4, at 175.
9. See, e.g.t A lan  R. W hite, M isleading Cases (1991) (arguing that courts have given 
misleading interpretations of concepts such as attempt, intention, knowledge, duress, and 
belief).
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natu ra l law  theories, w hich hold  th a t there  are  necessary connections be­
tw een law  and  m orality ,10 to  positivist views, w hich ho ld  th a t th e  tw o 
bear no  logical o r  conceptual relationship to  one ano ther.11 Perhaps the 
m ost thoroughgoing form  o f positivism  is th e  A m erican legal realist view 
th a t the  law  sim ply is w hat officials say it  is— w hatever else m igh t be 
thought about its justice  o r fairness.12 A  central disagreem ent in  the 
trad itional natu ra l law-legal positivism  debate has been w hether a  seri­
ously im m oral system  can be law  a t all. Some o f  th e  m ore extrem e n a tu ­
ra l law  theorists have argued th a t seriously im m oral legal systems— such 
as N azi G erm any’s— are n o t law  a t a ll.13 t
T he divide between natu ra l law  theory  and  legal positivism  has been 
the  stock characterization o f  th e  field o f  legal philosophy. Q uite recently, 
however, scholars have questioned w hether the  divide is a  very helpful 
starting  po in t for theorizing about the  na tu re  o f law .14 These scholars 
have shifted away from  conceptual questions— such as “w hat is law?” 
and  “are there necessary connections between law  and  m orality?”— to 
efforts to  do norm ative theory about law. O ther critics o f  trad itional ph i­
losophy o f law, however, reject norm ative theory  as indeterm inate, as 
incoherent, o r as m asking th e  rationalization o f privilege.15 A lthough I
10. E g ., S a in t Thomas Aquinas, Summa T heologica question 90, reprinted in T re a ­
t is e  on Law  (Summa Theologica, Q uestions 90-97) 1 (Henry Regnery Co. 1967); John 
Finnis, N a tu r a l  Law  an d  N a tu r a l  R igh ts (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980).
11. E g., John A ustin, T he Province o f  Ju risp rudence D eterm ined  (London, 
John Murray 1832); H.L.A. H a r t ,  The C oncept o f Law  (1961); H ans K elsen, The 
P u re  T heory  o f  Law  (Max Knight trans., 1970).
12. E g,, K a r l  L le w e lly n , The B ram ble Bush 12 (2d ed. 1951).
13. To American legal philosophers, perhaps the most familiar example of this disagree­
ment was the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller over the justifiability of the 
Nuremburg trials. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation o f Law and Morals, 71 H arv . 
L. Rev. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 
71 H arv . L. Rev. 630 (1958). Hart argued that Nuremburg must be understood and justified 
as a moral condemnation of the accused Nazis, not as a prosecution for legal violations. Hart, 
supra, at 618. Fuller argued for a purposive understanding of law, on which at least some of 
the Nazi commands—those that were secret, for example—were not law. On the basis of this 
understanding, he challenged the idea that the Nuremburg defendants had been prosecuted for 
actions that were legal under Nazi law. Fuller, supra, at 648-57.
14. Among these scholars Philip Soper suggests starting by linking legal and political the­
ory, and asking what constitutes a just state, what is a good legal system, and what is the basis 
of legal obligation. Philip Soper, A Theory of Law  (1984). Frederick Schauer embeds an 
analysis of law in an account of the value of prescriptive rules. Frederick Schauer, Play­
ing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making 
in Law and in Life (1991). And Roger Shiner argues that positivism and natural law theory 
each represent significant insights about law: Positivism emphasizes the claims of stability and 
settled law, and natural law theory the claims of political morality and the good society. 
Roger Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought (1992).
15. Pierre Schlag, for example, criticizes the kind of normative legal scholarship that 
surveys an area of the law and then makes recommendations about what doctrine ought to be
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th ink  norm ative w riting as it  occurs in law  reviews and  philosophy jo u r­
nals contains m uch unfortunate  com placency and  abstraction, I  am  un ­
abashedly a  norm ative theorist. This Essay is an  effort to  draw  links 
between philosophical w ork in  ethics and  law.
Perhaps th e  m ost politically im portan t, b u t also the m ost difficult, 
linkage between philosophy and  law  today  is the  extent to  w hich law 
does, should, o r  m ust accom m odate philosophical differences am ong citi­
zens. Justice B lackm un’s declaration in  R o e  v. W a d e  th a t it  was unnec­
essary fo r the  C ourt to  take a  position about fetal righ ts,16 for example, 
has been m uch m aligned. L ater discussions o f  the  abortion decisions 
have dealt explicitly w ith  w hether the  law  should resolve an  issue th a t is 
the  subject o f  strong, public philosophical disagreem ent.17 R onald 
D w orkin, am ong others, has taken  renew ed in terest in the argum ent th a t 
the  status o f  the  fetus is a  question o f  religious m orality  th a t ought no t to 
be resolved by the  state, b u t ought to  be left to  individual conscience.18 
A bortion  is no t th e  only area o f deep m oral disagreem ent am ong A m eri­
can citizens: Euthanasia, sexual conduct, ha te  speech, affirmative action, 
and even environm ental protection, are  all areas in  w hich the  structu re o f 
dispute reveals m oral paradigm s th a t diverge a t a  very deep level.
In  the  m idst o f  th is diversity, m y goal in  this Essay is to  develop 
som e m odest illustrations o f  how  an  understanding o f  the various kinds 
o f  connections between philosophy and law  m ight be helpful for law and 
lawyers. T here are, as I  have said, so m any connections between philoso­
phy  and  law  th a t m y illustrations are  bound to  be arbitrary . They are, 
however, linked by a  them e th a t is central to  b o th  m odem  law  and con­
tem porary  philosophy: w hether and  in  w hat ways value judgm ents can
accepted. He identifies this type of legal scholarship with bureaucratic avoidance of law as it 
actually functions and with the delegitimization of critical perspectives. Pierre Schlag, Norma- 
tivity and the Politics o f  Form, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 (1991). Richard Delgado argues that 
normative discourse is utterly indeterminate:
[F]or every social reformer’s plea, an equally plausible argument can be found 
against it. Normative analysis is always framed by those who have the upper hand so 
as either to rule out or discredit oppositional claims, which are portrayed as irrespon­
sible and extreme. Normative talk is deadening—it points us off into abstraction 
when it is particularity and detail that kindle conscience. Normativity is a kind of oil 
that lubricates the shifting plates of our experience, helping us ignore our inconsis­
tency and others* pain.. . .  It does all this while enabling us to be comfortable with 
our roles; normativity feels good.
Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique o f Normativity in Legal 
Thought, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 960-61 (1991).
16. 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
17. E g., R o n a ld  D w orkin, Life’s Dominion (1993); K e n t G re e n a w a lt,  R eli­
gious Convictions an d  P o li t ic a l  Choice (1988); L aurence  Tribe, A bortion: The 
C lash  o f  A bso lu tes (1990).
18. D w orkin, supra note 17.
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be justified. I  have chosen th is them e in  p a rt because skepticism  about 
value theory has been a  m ajor influence on A m erican w riting about the  
role o f courts. M ore im portantly , I  also believe th a t the  m ost difficult 
issue facing ou r legal system today  is determ ining how  to  deal w ith  dis­
agreem ents about deeply held values— such as sexual liberty, th e  righ t to  
life, individual responsibility, o r the  trea tm en t o f  ecosystems. Least m od­
estly, I  hope to  illustrate th a t philosophy provides insight in to  how  law 
should regard  these value disagreements.
In  the  U nited  States, unfortunately, philosophy has gotten off to  a 
bad  s ta rt for m any lawyers, precisely on the  issue o f skepticism  about 
values. T he Socratic m ethod has been m istaken in  legal education for a  
kind o f generalized skepticism, and  it  is w ith  th is m istake th a t I  begin. I  
suggest th a t a  better understanding o f  Socratic views about knowledge—  
in  philosophers’ term inology, “ Socratic epistemology”— w ould help set 
th e  stage for a  better understanding o f value theory  by lawyers. I  then  
develop a  related illustration o f  th e  historical influence o f philosophy on 
law; the  linkage between the  skepticism  about values o f th e  logical posi­
tivists and the  jud icial neutrality  advocated by constitutional theorists o f 
the  1950s and 1960s, such as H erbert W echsler o r A lexander Bickel, and 
still professed by m any today, such as Jo h n  H a rt Ely. N ext, I  take up 
philosophy’s re tu rn  to  value theory, particularly  John  R aw ls’s develop­
m ent o f a  liberal theory  o f justice. Perhaps no t surprisingly, R aw ls’s 
w ork has had  alm ost no  apparent d irect influence on court decisions, bu t 
has had  an  enorm ous influence on academ ic legal writing. R aw ls’s w ork 
is a  good illustration o f how  w hat philosophers do has the  potential to 
provide useful theoretical perspectives for lawyers. I  conclude w ith  a  dis­
cussion o f how  R aw lsian theory  can provide lim ited b u t helpful guidance 
for courts dealing w ith  deep conflicts over values, such as in the  abortion 
and  righ t to  die cases.
II. So cra tes  a n d  Sk e pt ic ism
F o r today’s generation o f lawyers, Socrates is a  fam iliar ghost. H e is 
supposedly brought back  to  life in  the  archetypical law professors o f T h e  
P a p e r  C h a s e 19 and  O n e L 20—images th a t are faded by age b u t still pow­
erful today. These reincarnations question students unrelentingly, teach­
ing them  to  “ th ink  like lawyers” and  to  becom e accustom ed to 
adversarial dialogue. A s originally conceived by C hristopher Colum bus 
Langdell, the  “ Socratic” m ethod was designed to  encourage students to
19. The Paper Chase (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).
20. Scott Turow, One L (1977).
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  27 L o y .  L. A. L. R e v .  69  1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4
uncover for themselves the  logical structu re  o f  com m on-law cases. 
T hrough  responding to  Socratic questioning, students w ould recognize 
h idden premises and  chains o f  argum ent and  w ould form ulate and test 
legal principles against b o th  real and  hypothetical cases. T hrough the 
m ethod, students’ analytic pow ers were to  be flexed, developed, and 
exercised.21
In  the  early P latonic dialogues, Socrates questioned his interlocutors 
in  o rder to  elicit the ir assum ptions and  values. T heir answers becam e the 
objects o f  exam ination and, alm ost always, refutation.22 H is interlocu­
to rs were all m en w ho w ould be expected to  be experts about the  topics 
under discussion: for example, generals N icias and  Laches about cour­
age,23 o r the  theologian E uthyphro  abou t piety.24 T o pu t it m ildly, they 
d id  no t like the  results o f  the  interrogations. Eventually, Socrates was 
charged w ith  “crim inal m eddling, in  th a t he inquires in to  things below 
th e  earth  and in  the  sky, and  m akes the  w eaker argum ent defeat the 
stronger, and  teaches o thers to  follow his exam ple.” 25 C ritics com plain 
th a t his law  professor reincarnations do the  sam e today. They delight in 
m aking the w eaker argum ent appear the  stronger and  in teaching stu ­
dents th a t argum ent can serve any end. In  the  views o f these critics, 
Socratic teachers tear dow n students’ deeply held values, b u t fail to  offer 
them  anything in  replacem ent.26 A s a  result students m ay be left gener­
ally skeptical about reasoned value justification. A lternatively, they m ay 
adopt a  k ind  o f levelling relativism : N o values are better th an  any
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21. E g ,, Steven A. Childress, The Baby and the Bathwater: Developing a Positive Socratic 
Method, 18 Law  T chr. 95 (1984). Childress, an American writing in a British journal, seeks 
to distinguish the good from the problematic in the Socratic method as it is used in American 
law schools. He characterizes the method as a “probing tool of intellectual and skills develop­
ment.” Id, at 96. It involves open scrutiny of cases, principles, law, and values. Id. at 106 n.5. 
Its problematic appendages are characterized as “teacher abuse and covert indoctrination." 
Id. at 96. For another generally favorable account of the method, which seeks its integration 
into legal writing classes, see Mary K. Kearney & Mary B. Beazley, Teaching Students How to 
*Think Like Lawyers’: Integrating Socratic Method with the Writing Process, 64 Temp. L. 
Rev. 885 (1991). Their view of the Socratic method is that its questioning drives students to 
understand presuppositions and the process of analysis. Id. at 887.
22. See, e.g., Richard Robinson, Elenchus, in The Philosophy o f S ocrates: A C ol­
le c tio n  o f  C r i t ic a l  Essays 78 (Gregory Vlastos ed., University of Notre Dame Press 1980) 
(1971).
23. See P la to , Laches, in The C o lle c te d  D ialogues o f P la to  123 (Edith Hamilton 
& Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
24. P la to , Euthyphro, in The C o lle c te d  D ialogues o f P la to , supra note 23, at 169.
25. P la to , Socrates’ Defense (Apology), in The C o lle c te d  D ialogues o f P la to , 
supra note 23, at 3, 5.
26. See Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 H arv. L. Rev. 392, 414-15 
(1971).
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others, so w hat is righ t fo r any individual is ju s t w hat he o r  she believes. 
T hus w hat is “ really righ t”  changes w ith  the  perspective o f  th e  speaker.
Such relativism  m ay be even m ore pernicious th a n  skepticism. I t  
forestalls criticism ; noth ing  m ore can be said abou t a  speaker’s values 
th an  th a t they  are deeply held. W hen values are  w idely shared, relativ­
ism  is likely to  m ask unth inking  acquiescence in  dom inant values. A bout 
tw enty years ago, in  a  w ell-known attack  on law  school education, 
D uncan  K ennedy argued th a t Socratic teaching, despite appearances o f 
neutrality , presupposes ideological com m itm ents to  authority , to  com pet­
itive judgm ents o f m erit, and  to  separations between public im passivity 
and  private com m itm ent.27 In  the  w orst case, Socratic teaching thus 
breeds a  com bination o f  cynicism and  adherence to  the  status quo.
T he historical Socrates, however, was neither a  skeptic n o r a  relativ­
ist. Indeed, skepticism  and  relativism  w ere views o f  the  Sophists a t 
w hom  Socrates directed so m uch o f his criticism . Socrates’s com m it­
m ent was to  virtue, w hich he  though t b o th  required and  was produced by 
knowledge.28 Socrates’s reply to  th e  relativists w as th a t they lacked 
knowledge o f  w hat they claim ed.29 W hy, then, the  incessant questioning 
and  apparen t refutational s truc tu re  o f  th e  early P latonic dialogues? 
G regory V lastos explains away the  apparen t paradox between Socrates’s 
pursu it o f v irtue and  th e  structu re  o f  Socratic inquiry in  term s o f  a  theory  
o f  knowledge developed from  the  Socratic dialogues.30 K nowledge is no t 
dogm atic certainty. I t  is a  process o f  achieving justified belief, belief th a t 
can best w ithstand criticism  a t a  given tim e, yet is always open to  
reexam ination.
I f  the ir critics are  right, the  archetypical Socratic law  teachers 
poorly reflect the  Socratic pursu it o f  virtue. They exemplify a  sophistry 
th a t can serve any end, stripped o f  the  underlying Socratic aim. T o be
27. Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 Y a le  Rev. L. & Soc. 
A ction  71 (1970). Extensive feminist criticism also argues that the Socratic method models 
dominant values. See, e.g. , Project: Gender, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: An 
Empirical Study o f  Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 S tan . L. Rev. 1209, 1220 n.76
(1988) (citing Meredith Gould, The Paradox o f Teaching Feminism and Learning Law, 7 
ALSA F. 270 (1983)). The Stanford project reports that in 1986, more male (43.7%) than 
female (28.5%) law graduates favored professors adept at Socratic dialogue, and that male 
graduates reported significantly higher levels of class participation than female graduates. Id, 
at 1239. However, these differences do not persist among current students, perhaps indicating 
a change in the way classes are conducted at Stanford. Id. at 1238.
28. Gregory Vlastos, Introduction: The Paradox o f Socrates, in The Philosophy o f Soc­
ra te s : A C o lle c tio n  o f C r i t ic a l  Essays, supra note 22, at 1, 6-8.
29. Terry Penner, Socrates and the Early Dialogues, in T he Cam bridge Companion t o  
P la to  121 (Richard Kraut ed., 1992).
30. Vlastos, supra note 28, at 7.
H e i n O n l i n e  - -  27 L o y .  L. A. L. R e v .  71 1 9 9 3 - 1 9 9 4
7 2  L O Y O L A  O F  L O S  A N G E L E S  L A W  R E V I E W  [V o l .  2 7 :6 5
sure, the  archetypes are  themselves caricatures. A nd  in today’s law 
schools, the  im age o f Socratic teaching seems to  be a t least fading around 
the  edges and, m ore likely, is gradually  slipping away as the  generations 
shift. Nonetheless, i t  seems to  m e th a t m uch o f the  skepticism and cyni­
cism  rem ain. I  th ink  th a t a  better understanding o f how  the  Socratic 
m ethod becam e problem atic in th e  teaching o f  law  w ould be helpful in 
dissipating th a t skepticism, and  th a t the  exam ple o f the  original Socrates 
is instructive in  th is regard.
W hen C hristopher Colum bus Langdell in troduced the  new m ethod 
o f Socratic law  teaching to  the  H arvard  Law  School, he did no t believe 
he  was charting a  course tow ards skepticism. Indeed, Langdell thought 
th a t law  was a  science on th e  m odel o f geom etry, w ith clear principles for 
students to  uncover.31 Some w ho doubted Langdellian certainty did so 
w ithin an  epistemology th a t allowed for reason and  justification in value 
theory. F o r example, Justice H olm es directed this fam ous criticism  a t 
Langdellian formalism:
T he life o f  the  law has no t been logic: it  has been experience.
T he felt necessities o f  the  tim e, the  prevalent m oral and polit­
ical theories, intuitions o f  public policy, avowed or uncon­
scious, even the  prejudices w hich judges share w ith their 
fellow-men, have had  a  good deal m ore to  do than  the  syllogism 
in  determ ining the  rules by w hich m en should be governed.32 
A lthough Justice H olm es has often been in terpreted  as a  skeptic,33 his 
views are  m ore accurately placed w ithin the  pragm atist philosophical 
trad ition  o f  his day. Charles Sanders Peirce and o ther pragm atists be­
lieved th a t facts and  values were inextricably linked, and th a t norm ative 
knowledge was possible th rough  experim entation.34 A ccording to  sev­
eral recent interpreters, Justice H olm es shared the  pragm atists’ view th a t
31. Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Con­
tracts at vi (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1871). Dean Langdell wrote,
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have 
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and cer­
tainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; 
and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student of 
law.
Id. See generally M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 
30 Am. J. L eg a l Hist. 95 (1986) (discussing evolution of dominant legal-scientific model 
before Langdell).
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) 
(1881).
33. Id. at xiii.
34. C h a rle s  S. Peirce, The Fixation o f Belief in W ritings o f  C h a rle s  Sanders 
P eirce  242, 248-49 (Christian J.W. Kloesel ed., 1986).
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norm ative knowledge could be gained th rough  experience.35 H olm es’s 
account o f  the  developm ent o f legal know ledge is an  example. Legal 
judgm ents about duties in  particu lar cases precede th e  form ation o f  gen­
eral principles. P articu lar judgm ents are tested in  light o f felt convic­
tions about the  correctness o f the ir results, and  in  term s o f  new cases. 
G radually , general principles emerge, w hich in  tu rn  shape convictions 
about new cases; law  develops th rough  dynam ic in teraction between 
cases and  principles.36
T he association between the  case m ethod and  skepticism  appears 
instead to  have been forged in  th e  w ake o f th e  positivism  o f th e  first h a lf  
o f the  tw entieth  century. T he logical positivists, particu larly  in  V ienna 
and  E ngland in  th e  early tw entieth  century, held as central tenets th a t 
statem ents o f fact and  judgm ents o f value are logically different in  kind. 
W hile statem ents o f  fact are  verifiable, o r  a t least in  theory  falsifiable, 
value judgm ents are  no t subjects o f knowledge. V alue judgm ents m ust 
instead be understood no t as m aking tru th  claims, b u t as expressions o f 
em otion, as prescriptions, o r perhaps as sim ply m eaningless.37 Influ­
enced by the  logical positivists, by F reud ian  psychology, and  by the 
m oral ho rro r o f the  Second W orld  W ar, extrem e realists such as Jerom e 
F ran k  were indeed skeptical, no t only o f Langdell’s approach, b u t o f nor­
m ative theory  m ore generally.38
Langdell’s rem arkable confidence in  the scientific natu re  o f  law  cer­
tain ly  invited critique. B ut an  u tte r rejection o f  reason in  norm ative the­
ory is an  extrem e response to  an  extrem e theory. Even Judge F ran k  
him self held w hat were arguably idealist hopes for the  N ew  D eal. B ut 
these hopes rem ained in  tension w ith  his skepticism  about jud icial rea­
soning.39 Pragm atism ’s com m itm ent to  experiential know ledge is a  bet­
te r  paradigm  for legal theory. T here are echoes o f pragm atism ’s 
experim ental epistemology in  G regory V lastos’s solution to  the  Socratic
35. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 S tan. L. Rev. 787, 788
(1989) (emphasizing linkages between thinking of Holmes and John Dewey); Catharine W. 
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism o f Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jn t 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 541, 579-81 (1988) (reading Holmes in terms of 
Peirce’s pragmatism).
36. See Hantzis, supra note 35, at 582.
37. See A.J. A yer, Language, T ru th  & Logic 5, 102-03 (2d ed. 1946).
38. See T hurm an A rn o ld , T he Symbols o f G overnm ent (1935); Jerom e F rank , 
Law  an d  th e  M odern Mind (1930); see also Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal 
Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America—Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. L eg a l 
Educ. 441, 458-60 (1986) (discussing Frank’s skepticism).
39. See Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy o f Legal Realism, 18 J.L. & Soc’Y. 
175, 176 (1991); see also Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention o f American Legal Realism, 12 
L eg a l S tud. 137, 153 (1992).
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paradox— th a t is, th a t knowledge lies n o t in  certain ty  b u t in the beliefs 
th a t best w ithstand ongoing scrutiny.40 Socrates thought th a t the way to  
knowledge lay in  reasoned inquiry— exam ination and  reexam ination 
th rough  dialogue. This m odel rem ains useful, b u t unfortunately had 
m oved to  the  background by the  second generation o f  Socratic law teach­
ers. A lso consigned to  the  background m ay have been efforts to  develop 
m odels for the  law  to  deal w ith  uncertainty, incom plete justification, and 
reasoned disagreem ent. I  re tu rn  to  these enterprises la ter in th is Essay.
III . Va l u e  Sk e pt ic ism  a n d  J u d ic ia l  R e s t r a in t
T he A m erican legal theorists w ho succeeded the extrem e legal real­
ists o f  the  1920s and 1930s did no t re tu rn  to  theorizing about values. 
Instead, th rough  a  variety o f  procedural m eans, they attem pted to  avoid 
substantive dispute altogether. Perhaps the  m ost im portan t scholarly in­
fluence on th e  generation o f lawyers tra ined  after the  Second W orld W ar 
was a  m anuscrip t developed by H enry  H a rt and  A lbert Sacks for s tu ­
dents a t H arvard  Law  School.41 This m anuscrip t was widely circulated 
b u t never form ally published. In  it, H a rt and  Sacks argued th a t law  was 
a  m eans fo r achieving social purposes th rough  institu tional settlem ents.42 
T he m ost com plex issues o f  institu tional design are  the  locus o f  decision­
m aking au thority  and  the  control o f discretion.43 A ccording to  H a rt and 
Sacks, there  is a  trade-off between accountability and discretion in polit­
ical institutions.44 D ecision-m aking structures in  w hich discretion is ex­
tensive, such as the  legislature, need to  be subject to  a  high degree of 
dem ocratic accountability.45 S tructures in  w hich discretion is highly 
controlled, such as the  courts, can be less im m ediately accountable.46 In  
the  legislature, decisions can take place th rough  the weighing and com ­
prom ising o f  policy goals, b u t in the courts, discretion is controlled 
th rough  the  reasoned elaboration o f  principle.47 Judges m ust explain, 
case by case, bo th  w hy they have the pow er to  resolve the  given dis­
40. I say “echoes” because Platonic ontology, with its eternal and unchanging forms, is 
decidedly not pragmatist.
41. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law (1958) (unpublished manuscript, available at William M. 
Raines Law Library, Loyola Law School); see Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal 
Process Tradition: The Legacy o f Hart & Sacksf 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 413 (1987) (discussing 
influence of manuscript).
42. Hart & Sacks, supra note 41, at 4-6.
43. See id. at 171.
44. See id.. at 173.
45. Id. at 178-79.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 173.
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pute— their jurisdictional au thority— and how  the ir resolution fits w ith  
o ther established applications o f  the  principles they em ploy.48 H a rt’s 
T h e  T im e  C h a r t  o f  th e  J u s tic e s , published w ithin a  year o f  th e  legal p ro ­
cess m anuscript, em phasizes the  im portance o f  principled constitutional 
adjudication and  criticizes th e  Suprem e C ourt for tak ing  m ore cases than  
it  can decide in  a  principled fashion.49
T he influence o f H a rt and  Sacks can be traced  th rough  a  series o f 
im portan t writings on  constitutional adjudication th a t appeared from  the  
la te 1950s th rough  the  1960s. B ro w n  v. B o a r d  o f  E d u c a t io n 50 had  been 
decided in 1954; and  despite the ir enthusiasm  for the  death  knell o f legal 
segregation in  education, some constitutional scholars were troubled by 
its constitutional basis. C ould a  principled rationale be articu lated  for 
B ro w n , o r was the  decision sim ply a  sym pathetic response to  the  devas­
tating  results o f segregation? T he B ro w n  opinion was criticized because 
the  C ourt bu ilt its analysis on a  finding o f  fact— segregated schools do 
n o t provide equal educations— ra th e r th an  on  a  constitutional foundation 
such as th a t “separate b u t equal”  facilities violate equal protection. 
W riting in  1959, H erbert W echsler advocated th e  device o f generality to  
lim it the  C ourt’s use o f value judgm ents.51 W echsler linked the  justifica­
tion  for judicial review to  the  C ourt’s obligation to  be “ entirely princi­
pled.” 52 H e w rote th a t “ [a] principled decision, in  the  sense I  have in 
m ind, is one th a t rests on reasons w ith  respect to  all th e  issues in the  case, 
reasons th a t in  the ir generality and  the ir neutrality  transcend any im m e­
diate result th a t is involved.” 53 F o r W echsler, the  problem  w ith  B ro w n  
was th a t its reasoning d id  no t rest on m ore general principles, such as the 
freedom  o f association o r across-the-board rejection o f the  separate bu t 
equal doctrine.54 L ater critics have observed th a t generality by itself is 
com patible w ith  principles o f any content; thus, the  requirem ent is 
em pty.55
48. Id. at 172.
49. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart o f the Justices, 73 H arv . L. Rev. 84 
(1959).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles o f Constitutional Law, 73 H arv . L. 
Rev. 1 (1959).
52. Id. at 19.
53. Id. For an interpretation of Wechsler as a proceduralist, see Laurence E. Wiseman, 
The New Supreme Court Commentators: The Principledthe Political, and the Philosophical, 
10 H astings Const. L.Q. 315, 350 (1983).
54. Wechsler, supra note 51, at 32-33.
55. E g., John H a r t  E ly, Dem ocracy an d  D is tru s t  55 (1980).
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A lexander Bickel was ano ther constitutional scholar w ho relied on 
process to  articu la te a  theory  o f  jud icial review.56 Bickel criticized the 
apparen t resu lt orientation o f the  realists and  the  nihilism  o f the ir m ost 
extrem e adherents, and  praised H a rt’s em phasis on principled articu la­
tion  in  T h e  T im e  C h a r t  o f  th e  J u s tic e s .51 L ike W echsler, Bickel em pha­
sized the  im portance o f  judicial neutrality; but, unlike W echsler, Bickel 
also believed th a t th e  C ourt should stay ou t o f  cases th a t it was no t insti­
tutionally  suited to  decide, even w hen a  principled rationale was avail­
able for the  decision.58 Thus, Bickel advocated the  “passive virtues”—  
devices such as the  doctrines o f jurisdiction, standing, ripeness, o r the 
political question doctrine— to  allow the  C ourt to  w ithhold u ltim ate con­
stitu tional judgm ent.
D espite Bickel’s contention th a t these doctrines o f  restrain t could 
also be given a  principled defense, his critics argued th a t they represented 
grave concessions to  expediency. F o r example, G erald  G un ther w rote 
th a t “Bickel’s ‘virtues’ are  ‘passive’ in nam e and  appearance only: a  viru­
len t variety o f free-wheeling interventionism  lies a t the  core o f  his devices 
o f  restrain t.” 59 In  his la ter writings, Bickel him self em braced a  Burkean 
conservatism  as the  only w ay to  give an  account for the  role o f the 
C ourt.60 T he extent to  w hich doctrines o f judicial restra in t conceal unar­
ticulated  value judgm ents rem ains a  heated topic o f  discussion today, as 
illustrated by the  confirm ation hearings on the  nom ination o f Judge R ob­
ert B ork to  the  Suprem e C ourt.61
Perhaps the m ost successful recent advocate o f  jud icial restra in t by 
m eans o f process theory  is John  H a rt Ely. Ely rejects the  em ptiness o f 
neu tra l principles and the  relativity o f Bickel’s u ltim ate traditionalism , 
along w ith  philosophical reasoning m ore generally, as sources for the 
courts to  use to  articulate fundam ental values.62 A bout the ability o f the 
courts to  use m oral philosophy as a  basis for deciding cases, Ely is 
scathing:
T he basic idea thus seems to  be th a t m oral philosophy is w hat 
constitutional law is properly about, th a t there exists a  correct
56. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2d ed. 1986) (originally 
published in 1962).
57. Id. at 27 (referring to Hart’s idea that Supreme Court is “predestined . . .  to be a voice 
of reason”).
58. Harry H. Wellington, Foreword to Bickel, supra note 56, at ix-x.
59. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices o f  the Passive Virtues—A Comment on Principle and 
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1964).
60. Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 11-25 (1975) (discussing 
views of Edmund Burke).
61. See R o b ert H. Bork, T he Tempting o f  Am erica (1990).
62. See E ly, supra note 55, at 59-60, 71-72.
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w ay o f doing such philosophy, and  th a t judges are  b e tte r than  
others a t identifying and  engaging in  it. N ow  I  know  lawyers 
are  a  cocky lot: the  fact th a t ou r profession brings us in to  con­
tac t w ith  m any disciplines often generates th e  delusion th a t we 
have m astered them  all. B ut surely the  claim  here cannot be 
th a t lawyers and  judges are  th e  best im aginable people to  tell 
good m oral philosophy from  bad: m em bers o f th e  clergy, nov­
elists, m aybe historians, to  say noth ing  o f  professional m oral 
philosophers, all seem m ore sensible candidates for th is job .63 
E ly adds the  skeptical observation th a t the  problem s lie n o t only w ith  the 
questionable ability o f lawyers to  do philosophy, b u t also w ith  th e  as­
sum ption th a t there  is a  preferred m ethod o f  philosophy.64 H e then  ar­
gues for restraint: th a t the  C ourt m ay step in  to  correct legislative errors 
o f  process b u t no t o f  substance.65 Relying on  Justice H arlan  Fiske 
Stone’s fam ous footnote,66 Ely concludes th a t the  C ourt m ay ac t to  p ro ­
tect discrete and  insu lar m inorities, isolated from  the  political process, o r 
to  correct o ther structu ra l errors o f representation.67 B ut the  C ourt m ay 
no t act to  correct legislative judgm ents th a t it  believes are  sim ply wrong, 
such as C onnecticut’s prohibition o f  the  use o f contraceptives, o r Texas’s 
restrictions on abortion.68
Since its publication in  1980, E ly’s book has stood as a  landm ark  
effort to  separate process from  substance in  a  theory  o f adjudication. 
E ly’s w ork has been particularly  troubling for liberals, because E ly h im ­
self shares m any o f the  political persuasions o f  liberals, and  because he 
has dissociated him self from  “ original in ten t” 69 theorists and  the ir gener­
ally conservative aim s.70 Ely’s critics have argued, however, th a t the  sep­
aration  between process and  substance cannot be neatly draw n, and  th a t 
m uch o f w hat is characterized as process-based adjudication actually  re­
lies on substantive com m itm ents. F o r example, D aniel O rtiz  points ou t 
th e  range o f judgm ents th a t are involved in  characterizing no t only 
blacks, b u t o ther burdened groups such as women, aliens, o r gays and 
lesbians, as “discrete and insu lar m inorities.” 71 O ther critics have a t­
63. Id. at 56.
64. Id. at 57-58.
65. Id. at 73-74.
66. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
67. E ly, supra note 55, at 75-77, 86-87.
68. See John Hart Ely, The Wages o f Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Y a le  
L.J. 920 (1973) (arguing that Roe v. Wade lacked constitutional foundation).
69. E ly , supra note 55, at 12-13.
70. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Calculus o f Distrust, 77 Va. L. Rev. 653, 656 (1991).
71. Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure o f Process Theory, 
77 Va. L. Rev. 721, 727, 738 (1991).
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tacked E ly’s fundam ental reasons for preferring process to  substance. 
F rederick  Schauer, for example, questions Ely’s d istrust o f  the 
counterm ajoritarian  character o f  courts.72 Schauer argues th a t the  ex­
ten t to  w hich we tru s t process values is a  function o f  how  we th ink  the 
process is working. I f  we th ink  th e  process is w orking relatively well, it 
seems risky to  venture fo rth  into substantive areas th a t m ight, w ith  dif­
ferent actors, be decided differently. I f  we th ink  the  process is m aking 
im portan t m oral m istakes, however, “ the  com parative virtues o f  process 
m ay be less clear.” 73
D espite its variety and  appeal, the  re treat to  process has thus proved 
unsatisfactory in  m any ways. A nd  while the  debate about process has 
continued, the  C ourt has decided issues o f enorm ous im portance to  the 
lives o f  citizens. T he C ourt has ruled, for example, th a t gay m en do not 
have a  fundam ental constitutional righ t to  engage in acts o f consensual 
sodom y.74 W e m ay assum e for th e  sake o f  argum ent th a t com petent 
adults have a  constitutional righ t to  decline unw anted m edical care.75 
W om en have a  constitutional righ t to  choose to  have an  abortion before 
fetal viability, a  righ t th a t th e  state  m ay no t unduly burden .76 These and 
m any o ther decisions have proven enorm ously contrpversial because they 
involve m oral issues th a t are  deeply divisive in  A m erican society. H ow  
should the  C ourt decide w hen to  intervene in such cases o f deep m oral 
controversy? A nd  can philosophy provide any guidance?
IV. T h e  R a w l s ia n  E x a m p l e
T he disarray o f  substantive m oral theory  was an  im portan t factor in 
the  re trea t to  process ju s t described.77 F rom  the 1930s to  the  1960s A n­
glo-A m erican academ ic philosophy, heavily influenced by positivism, 
largely rejected any serious w ork in norm ative theory. In  the  wake o f the 
dom inance o f logical positivism, m oral philosophy dealt w ith w hat were 
called questions o f  “m etaethics”— questions, for example, about the 
logic o f m oral language o r th e  m eaning o f m oral term s. I t  was thought 
th a t these questions adm itted  o f  clear answers, unlike questions about 
r ig h t and  w rong or the  justification o f  such substantive judgm ents. The 
dom inant view was th a t norm ative claims are noncognitive: They appeal
72. Schauer, supra note 70, at 657.
73. Id. at 666.
74. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
75. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
77. See, e.g.t E ly, supra note 55, at 57-58.
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to  em otion, they persuade, o r they  prescribe.78 Thus, there  are  no  ra ­
tional standards for settling m oral disagreem ents. W e m ay d irect all o f 
ou r persuasive ta lents against A dolph  H itler, b u t have no  particu lar 
claim  to  reasoned argum ent against h im , m uch less to  a  dem onstration 
th a t he was grievously wrong.
By the  late 1960s, however, academ ic philosophy was beginning to  
re tu rn  to  norm ative ethical and  political theory. T he political context 
was the  civil rights m ovem ent and  th e  protests against the  w ar in  V iet­
nam . Perhaps the  m ost notable signal o f  th e  re tu rn  to  norm ative the­
ory79 was the  w ork o f John  Rawls, particu larly  the  publication in  1971 of 
A  T h e o ry  o f  J u s tic e .60 M y focus on R aw ls’s w ork here reflects its origi­
nality  and  centrality; there  has, o f course, been m uch o ther im portan t 
w ork in value theory  since its initial publication.
In  A  T h eo ry  o f  J u s tic e , R aw ls developed and  defended an  extended 
version o f liberal theory. This theory  elaborated tw o basic principles o f 
justice and  developed a  fram ew ork for the ir justification.81 T he tw o p rin ­
ciples were roughly egalitarian, b u t perm itted  inequalities w hen they 
w ork to  the  benefit o f all. Specifically, R aw ls’s first principle required 
everyone to  have equal basic liberties, com patible w ith  like liberties for 
all. I t  had  priority  over the  second principle, th a t social and  econom ic 
inequalities were unjustified unless they  w ork to  th e  advantage o f  all, and 
are  attached  to  positions and  offices open to  all. These tw o principles 
were o f im m ediate appeal to  legal scholars interested in  issues o f individ­
ual liberty82 and  econom ic justice.83 They continue to  be used today to  
support argum ents for enhanced social equality in  areas such as health  
care reform 84 o r the  in terpretation  o f  the  A m ericans w ith  Disabilities 
A ct.85
78. See R.M. H are, The L anguage o f M o ra ls  (1952); C h a rle s  L. S tevenson, E th ­
ics an d  L anguage (1944).
79. See, e.g., R o b e rt L. A rrin g to n , R ationalism , Realism, an d  R elativism : P e r­
spectives in C ontem porary  M o ra l Epistem ology 5 (1989).
80. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
81. Id. at 60-65.
82. E.g., R o n a ld  D w orkin, Taking R ights Seriously  149 (1977).
83. See, e.g. , Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four­
teenth Amendment, 83 H arv . L. Rev. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations o f “Just Compensation” Law, 80 H arv . L. 
Rev. 1165 (1967). These highly influential articles utilized papers of Rawls that appeared 
before the publication of A Theory o f Justice.
84. E.g., Norm an D aniels, Ju s t H e a l th  C are  (1985).
85. Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29, 42, and 47 U.S.C.); see W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil 
Rights o f People with Disabilities and John Rawls’s Concept o f Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. Rev. 
295 (1992) (explaining that Americans with Disabilities Act is aimed at providing disabled
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Raw ls called the  fram ew ork for justifying these tw o principles the 
“original position.” 86 T he  original position was a  though t experim ent in 
w hich individuals were to  ask w hat principles o f justice they m ight 
choose if  they  w ere rational b u t behind th e  “veil o f ignorance”— th a t is, 
deprived o f  knowledge o f  the ir own individual and  social circum stances. 
R aw ls’s argum ent was th a t individuals in  the  original position would 
choose to  guarantee themselves th e  best m inim um  position by ensuring 
basic liberties and  protecting the  situation o f  the  least well off.87
T here are, o f  course, enorm ous difficulties w ith  R aw ls’s complex 
and  am bitious theory. T o  take a  cu rren t problem , are  the  least well off to  
be defined in  term s o f econom ic circum stances, socio-physical circum ­
stances such as disability, o r a  com bination o f factors? R aw ls argued 
th a t the  original position was the  perspective from  w hich m oral princi­
ples should be adopted, because it  stripped individuals o f inform ation 
about themselves th a t was “arb itrary”  from  a  m oral poin t o f view.88 Ine­
qualities o f genetic endow m ent, o r o f parental econom ic status, are  no t 
w ithin the  individual’s control, and  should no t be p a rt o f ou r selection of 
th e  principles o f  justice  th a t are to  govern us all. A n  early critic of 
Raw ls, R obert N ozick, argued th a t R aw ls’s original position allowed far 
too  little  w eight to  entitlem ents based on original acquisition o r legiti­
m ate transfer o f p roperty .89 N ozick’s underlying concern was th a t 
Raw ls allowed far too  little  scope (for a  liberal) to  individual freedom 
and  desert. Later, m ore com m unitarian critics have argued th a t the 
R aw lsian conceptualization strips hum an beings o f  the  personal projects 
and  relationships th a t are central to  self-definition.90
A t its core, R aw ls’s defense o f  bo th  the original position and its two 
principles rests on a  view about the  natu re  o f  m oral reasoning. M oral 
views develop, Raw ls argued, as “ considered judgm ents in reflective 
equilibrium .” 91 T he original position captures the idea th a t we should 
no t be able to  design the  w orld to  ou r advantage.92 B ut it is no t to  be 
regarded as a  set o f foundational first principles from  w hich particu lar 
principles are  to  be derived; rather, the original position represents “rea­
sonable stipulations to  be assessed eventually by the whole theory to
Americans with fundamental equality, which is necessary for social justice under Rawls’s the­
ory of “justice as fairness”).
86. R aw ls, supra note 80, at 17-22.
87. Id. at 144.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 198-204 (1974).
90. See, e.g., M ichae l J. S andel, L iberalism  an d  th e  Limits o f  Ju stice  (1982).
91. R aw ls, supra note 80, at 51.
92. Id. at 18.
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w hich they belong.” 93 T he tw o principles, and  the ir iterations th rough  
levels in  w hich fundam ental constitutional structures, laws, and  adjudi­
cative determ inations are  chosen, are  tested  in  ligh t o f ou r provisional 
judgm ents about particu lar cases.94 These judgm ents m ay be revised in 
ligh t o f  the theory— or, they m ay in  tu rn  lead us to  reassess theoretical 
com m itm ents. M oral theory  w orks back  and  forth , from  theory to  in tu ­
itions, achieving and  reachieving coherence.
R aw ls’s notion o f  reflective equilibrium  has been understood in 
m any different ways. Sunstein’s sum m ary is a  good one:
W e m ight accord greater o r  lesser w eight to  particu lar situa­
tional judgm ents o r to  interm ediate-level principles; m ake dif­
ferent decisions about w hat counts as a  d istortion o f  judgm ent; 
stress o r dow nplay the  role o f  philosophical argum ents; evalu­
a te  in  different ways the appropriate o r possible am ount o f  con­
gruence between the  general and  the  particular; bring to  bear a  
few general theories o r a  large num ber; reject o r  value appar­
ently em otional reactions; and  counsel deference o r indifference 
to  very high-level theories.95 
Significant criticism s o f  any o f these variations include w hether theory 
can  be separated from  judgm ents in  particu lar cases in  the  way the  m eth­
odology suggests, w hether the  m ethodology pu ts too m uch w eight on 
intuitions th a t m irro r the  status quo, and  w hether any coherentist view 
perm its adequate critique o f existing institutions.
O ver th e  years R aw ls him self has gradually  changed his views about 
th e  status o f m oral theorizing. H e attributes the  change to  the  recogni­
tion  th a t any theory  o f  justice m ust account for fundam ental m oral dis­
agreem ents am ong actual citizens. O ur considered judgm ents in 
reflective equilibrium  will be shared to  an  extent th a t is lim ited a t best. 
A s Raw ls puts the  point:
A  m odem  dem ocratic society is characterized no t sim ply by a  
pluralism  o f com prehensive religious, philosophical, and  m oral 
doctrines b u t by a  pluralism  o f incom patible yet reasonable 
com prehensive doctrines. N o one o f these doctrines is affirmed 
by citizens generally. . . . Political liberalism  assumes tha t, for 
political purposes, a  plurality  o f  reasonable yet incom patible 
com prehensive doctrines is the  norm al resu lt o f th e  exercise o f
93. Id. at 578.
94. Id. at 200.
95. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 751 (footnote omitted); see Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. P hil. 256 (1979).
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hum an reason w ithin th e  fram ew ork o f  the  free institutions o f  a 
constitutional dem ocratic regim e.96 
Raw ls views the  fundam ental problem  o f liberal theory  in actual societies 
as th e  accom m odation o f  th e  values o f  justice and  stability am ong those 
w ith  different, b u t reasonable m oral views: “H ow  is it possible th a t there 
m ay exist over tim e a  stable and  ju s t society o f  free and  equal citizens 
profoundly divided by reasonable though incom patible religious, philo­
sophical, and  m oral doctrines?” 97
Since the  publication o f  A  T h e o ry  o f  J u s tic e , Raw ls has developed a 
com plex and  multileveled answ er to  the  tensions am ong justice, stability, 
and  pluralism . H e continues to  believe th a t the  basic principles o f justice 
m ust be w orked ou t in  a  “freestanding” m anner, independent o f  people’s 
knowledge o f  the ir particu lar conceptions o f  the  good.98 B ut these prin ­
ciples are  to  be tested as political, no t m etaphysical, doctrines. A  polit­
ical conception o f justice  m ust be sufficiently stable. In  a  p luralist society 
th is m eans th a t it  m ust be a  conception o f  justice on w hich there is an 
overlapping consensus o f  endorsem ent from  a  variety o f  reasonable 
points o f view. Such an overlapping consensus is no t a  m ere com prom ise 
o r  tem porary  accom m odation th a t m ight be undone by changes in dom i­
n an t political views, an  accom m odation w hich Raw ls calls a m o d u s  
v iv e n d i ."  I t  is instead a  consensus th a t can be accepted as reasonable 
from  the  points o f  view o f a  variety o f reasonable doctrines. In  R aw ls’s 
view, political philosophy is thus largely detached from  o ther areas of 
philosophy, such as epistemology o r philosophy o f religion. I t  incorpo­
rates as a  theory o f the  good only the  shared com m itm ent to  the equality 
o f  free, ra tional persons, and  to  the  goods needed to  affirm th a t equality. 
R aw ls refers to  th is lim ited group o f goods as prim ary— goods such as 
basic liberties and  the  social bases o f  self-respect.100 T he Raw lsian the­
ory o f  justice thus does n o t take sides on such questions as w hether heter­
osexual o r  hom osexual relationships can be p a rt o f the  good life, o r w hat 
kind o f quality o f life is o f  value to  the  individual w ho lives it, o r even 
w hat k ind o f knowledge we can have about such issues. Instead, R aw ls’s 
theory reaches only to  basic social structures th a t can be the subject o f an 
overlapping consensus am ong those w ho hold  quite different views about 
sexual relationships o r the  quality o f life. Public dialogue and action 
should be aim ed a t this overlapping consensus and no t a t the furtherance
96. John Rawls, Political Liberalism at xv-xvi (1993).
97. Id. at xviii.
98. Id. at 140.
99. Id. at 145, 170-71.
100. Id. at 180.
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o f com prehensive w orld views th a t are  no t generally shared. Thus, ac­
cording to  Rawls, a  ju s t and  stable legal system  w ould p ro tec t diversity 
on such m atters as sexual orientation o r abortion a t least th rough  early 
stages o f  pregnancy.101 A ccordingly, R o e  v. W a d e 102 and  P la n n e d  
P a r e n th o o d  v. C a s e y 103 were ju s t decisions; B o w e rs  v. H a r d w i c k 104 was 
not. Thus, although R aw ls does n o t share w ith  th e  process theorists the 
belief th a t all substantive com m itm ents can  be avoided, he does share the 
belief th a t politics m ust accom m odate some norm ative dispute.
R aw ls’s theory  in  general and  his discussions o f  particu lar social is­
sues have been o f  enorm ous interest to  academ ic legal w riters. T here are 
literally thousands o f law  review articles th a t use R aw lsian theory  to  ana­
lyze concrete legal problem s along roughly liberal and  egalitarian 
lines.105 I t  is im possible to  determ ine how  influential these articles have 
been on actual legal practice. D espite its sta tu re  am ong philosophers and 
legal academics, however, R aw ls’s w ork appears to  have h ad  alm ost no 
direct influence on courts. H is w ork has never been cited by the  U nited 
States Suprem e C ourt, unlike John  S tuart M ill’s defense o f  liberty  w hich 
was cited as early as 1887106 and  continues to  draw  reference in  m ore 
contem porary constitutional disputes.107 T here are  a  few scattered refer­
ences to  R aw ls’s w riting in  appellate cases, such as in support o f the  view 
th a t th e  indigent have a  righ t to  psychological assistance in com m itm ent 
proceedings108 o r th e  view th a t the  doctrine o f  em ploym ent-at-w ill 
should no t allow an  em ployer to  fire an  em ployee w hose pension rights 
are  about to  becom e vested.109 A p art from  these scattered references, 
there  is a  line o f dissenting opinions from  M issouri th a t a ttem pts to  use 
R aw lsian discussions o f fairness to  analyze how  to  calculate to r t recov­
eries.110 Because A  T h e o ry  o f  J u s tic e  appeared over tw enty years ago,
101. Id. at 243 & n.32.
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
104. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
105. See, e.g., Robert P. Bums, Rawls and the Principles o f Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 184 (1989); David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1341, 1343 
(1987); Stephen M. Griffin, Reconstructing Rawls’s Theory o f Justice: Developing a Public Val­
ues Philosophy o f the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 715 (1989).
106. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 632 (1887).
107. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring).
109. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1368 & n.4 (Nev. 1987).
110. K g., Jensen v. ARA Servs., Inc., 736 S.W.2d 374, 381-82 (Mo. 1987) (Welliver, J., 
dissenting); Barnes v. Tools & Mach. Builders, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 518, 523-24 (Mo. 1986) 
(Donelly, J., dissenting); Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Mo. 1986) 
(Donelly, J., dissenting).
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th is is n o t a  very encouraging list for those w ho m ight hope to  find m ajor 
philosophical developm ents having an im pact on th e  law.
B ut I  do no t th ink  th a t such direct incorporation is how  we ought to 
expect philosophical developm ents to  find the ir way in to  law .111 W e 
should n o t try  to  take philosophy in to  legal decision m aking on the im ­
m ediate substantive level by telling judges they ought to  be philosophers. 
R ather, philosophy finds its relevance on the  level o f  serious thinking 
about dispute and  justification. In  o rder to  consider w hen law should 
intervene in the  lives o f  citizens, it  m atters th a t we have a  good idea o f 
the  na tu re  and  character o f  disputes am ong citizens. R aw ls’s theory  rep­
resents a  way o f th inking about the  role o f  law  in  a  dem ocratic society 
th a t is a  useful corrective to  the  skepticism  about values th a t drove p ro ­
cess theorists to  advocate judicial restrain t. R aw ls’s m ost recent w ork on 
justice and  stability suggests th a t differing conceptions o f the good 
should no t be incorporated in to  law  unless they are  the subject o f an 
overlapping consensus o f public reason .112 This constrain t respects the 
equality o f  citizens w ith different, b u t reasonable points o f view. Rawls 
applied th is constrain t quite directly to  jud icial decision m aking: “Public 
reason applies especially to  the  jud iciary  in  its decisions and as the one 
institu tional exem plar o f  public reason.” 113
M oreover, in o rder to  consider w hen judicial review o f legislative 
intervention is appropriate, we need to  determ ine how  well the  political 
process is protecting th is conception o f  the  equality o f  citizens.114 A long 
these lines Samuel Freem an has developed a  R aw lsian account o f  judicial 
review, in  reply to  John  H a rt E ly and  o thers.115 A ccording to  Freem an 
the  central problem  in justifying judicial review is no t th a t it is anti- 
m ajoritarian. T he problem  is instead th a t jud icial review represents a 
conflict between protection o f individual rights and  the  participation, 
th rough  legislation, o f  citizens in the  decisions th a t affect the ir lives. To 
assess w hether judicial review is o r  is no t consistent w ith  dem ocracy, 
F reem an constructs a  R aw lsian constitutional convention, and asks 
w hether free and  equal sovereign individuals would choose institutions
111. But see Wiseman, supra note 53, at 317 (arguing that Rawlsian theory has directly 
influenced views of some constitutional commentators).
112. R aw ls, supra note 96, at 174-76, 247.
113. Id. at 252-53.
114. See Schauer, supra note 70, at 658-59.
115. Samuel P. Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy o f Judicial Review, 
9 Law  & P h il. 327 (1990-1991). Freeman’s paper won the biannual 1990-1992 Berger Me­
morial Prize of the American Philosophical Association for the best paper in philosophy of 
law.
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th a t include judicial review.116 H e argues th a t jud icial review w ould be 
adopted as p a rt o f  a  shared precom m itm ent to  protecting th e  equal rights 
o f dem ocratic sovereignty. In  Freem an’s view th e  justification for ju d i­
cial review is thus strategic: I t  depends on  w hether o r no t we have good 
reason to  th ink  th a t legislative processes will correct themselves, o r 
w hether judicial correctives are  necessary for guaranteeing equal trea t­
m ent o f citizens.117
Thus R aw lsian theory suggests tw o basic views about the  role o f 
law. F irst, law  should no t intervene to  im pose views o f  the  good life on 
citizens w ho hold  different, b u t reasonable, conceptions o f the  good; in­
stead, law  should  p ro tec t the  goods and  the  bases o f self-respect required 
for these different lives. Second, th e  justification o f  judicial review lies in 
the  need for intervention to  correct legislative m isjudgm ent and  to  p ro ­
tec t the  equal bases o f self-respect am ong citizens.
V . M o r a l  P h il o s o p h y  a n d  L a w
O n the  R aw lsian account ju s t developed, philosophy helps in  under­
standing the basic fram ew ork o f justice, th e  character o f  m oral dispute, 
the  extent to  w hich there  is overlapping consensus, and  th e  m eans by 
w hich legal institutions m aintain  basic equality am ong citizens. R aw ls’s 
views are  neither skeptical no r absolutist about values; instead, in true  
liberal fashion, he  seeks to  construct a  fram ew ork w ithin w hich different 
conceptions o f the  good can flourish. B ut there  are notorious difficulties 
w ith  this theory, even as it  has developed in  recent years. Several o f 
these difficulties are  particularly  im portan t to  understanding th e  role of 
law  in relation to  deep m oral disputes am ong citizens.
F irst, Raw ls links stability to  overlapping consensus am ong those 
w ith different, b u t reasonable, conceptions about justice and  the  good 
society.118 H e claims th a t reasonableness is n o t a  strong norm ative no­
tion; it m eans only a  willingness to  cooperate and to  adop t policies th a t 
can be justified to  those w ith  differing points o f  view.119 R aw ls describes 
reasonableness in the  following m ild term s: “T he only com prehensive 
doctrines th a t ru n  afoul o f public reason are  those th a t cannot support a 
reasonable balance o f political values.” 120 Y et the  extent to  w hich R aw l­
sian notions such as reasonableness— or, m ore obviously, th e  theory  o f
116. Id. at 343-44.
117. Id. at 354-55.
118. R aw ls, supra note 96, at 38-39.
119. Id. at 253.
120. Id. at 243.
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prim ary  goods— conceal significant value judgm ents, has been an ongo­
ing subject o f  criticism .
T he problem  o f abortion is an  excellent example. T o  his description 
o f  reasonableness, R aw ls appends a  footnote th a t suggests th a t three im ­
p o rtan t political values are  a t issue in  the abortion debate: the  due re­
spect for hum an life, the  ordered reproduction o f society, and  the  status 
o f  wom en as equal citizens. F rom  a  balance o f these values, Raw ls 
reaches the  conclusion th a t any com prehensive doctrine th a t prohibits 
abortion in  the  first trim ester w ould no t be reasonable.121 B ut abortion 
opponents w ho believe th a t respect for hum an life is no t subject to  com ­
prom ise in  th is w ay w ould disagree w ith  the  reasonableness o f th is con­
clusion. Raw ls’s reply is th a t such opponents are  unreasonable because 
o f  the  way in  w hich they reject com prom ise; b u t the ir precise po in t is 
th a t o thers are unreasonable no t to  recognize th a t hum an  life has value 
th a t does no t perm it com prom ise. W hether o r no t the ir underlying view 
is plausible— and it  is no t m y view— it is clear th a t abortion opponents 
w ould be correct in pointing ou t th a t th e  R aw lsian notion o f reasonable­
ness pu ts com prom ise and  dialogue above o ther deeply held values.
R aw ls w ould n o t dispute the  claim  th a t his version o f liberal theory 
is com m itted to  the  values o f  com prom ise and  m oral dialogue, and tha t 
notions such as reasonableness em body th a t com m itm ent. In  his view 
reasoned pluralism — a pluralism  th a t lets diverse b u t reasonable lives 
flourish—is the  essence o f  liberalism . B ut the  effort to  specify th is rea­
soned pluralism  brings to  the  fore a  second m ajor difficulty w ith R aw ls’s 
work. Reasoned pluralism  w orks best for the  classical issues o f “negative 
freedom ,” 122 issues th a t le t individuals w ith  different points o f view go 
the ir own ways w ithout interfering w ith  one another. Issues o f interde­
pendence am ong individuals, however, do no t afford such noninterven­
tionist solutions.
A bortion  once again is a  good example. A  policy o f  nonintervention 
perm its wom en who encounter unw anted pregnancies to  bear them  to 
term , o r to  seek abortions, as they choose. B ut the policy does no t guar­
antee success in  the  search. W om en w anting abortions m ay be unable to 
find health  care providers willing to  perform  them , o r they m ay be un­
able to  pay the  price. T hey cannot effectuate the ir choices by simply 
going th e ir own way, b u t are  dependent on the  willingness o f others to  
cooperate in the ir plans. N egative freedom  perm its the  choice o f abor­
tion; positive freedom  enables action on th a t choice. This is exactly the
121. Id. at 243 n.32.
122. See, e.g., Isaiah  B erlin , F o u r Essays on L iberty  121-31 (1969).
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distinction draw n by th e  Suprem e C ourt in  affirming the  H yde A m end­
m ent’s 123 prohibition o f  federal funding for abortions. In  H a r r is  v. M c ­
R a e , 124 the  C ourt said ou trigh t th a t th e  constitutional righ t o f  liberty 
does no t guarantee the  m eans to  ac t on one’s choices.125 B ut the  resu lt is 
inequality am ong lives: W om en who choose abortions, b u t lack the 
m eans to  obtain them , are less able to  im plem ent critical life choices th an  
w om en who have the  m eans to  obtain them . Similarly, poor w om en who 
choose to  bear pregnancies to  te rm  b u t w ho cannot pay for health  care 
are  significantly worse off in  carrying ou t the ir choices th an  are  women 
w ith  means.
R aw ls’s second principle is an  im portan t step tow ard  a  solution to  
th is difficulty. R aw ls envisions reasoned pluralism  against a  background 
o f the ju s t distribution o f  resources. Therefore, poor wom en w ould no t 
be left w ithout the  resources to  obtain abortions, should they choose to  
have them . This m ore general com m itm ent to  social justice avoids the 
d irect conflict attacked by the  H yde A m endm ent. Social resources 
should no t be earm arked for abortions directly. R ather, the  resource 
transfers w hich occur are  aim ed a t enabling each person to  enjoy the 
m inim al bases o f  self-respect. O n th is basis, individuals m ay then  pursue 
different, b u t reasonable, choices.
This use o f  R aw ls’s second principle suggests fu rther guidelines 
about the  role o f law  in  the face o f m oral disagreem ents am ong citizens. 
Legislative initiatives will be needed to  im prove justice in the  distribution 
o f resources. B ut these initiatives should n o t underm ine reasoned p lural­
ism. Legislative efforts a t redistribution should be consistent w ith  differ­
ent, b u t reasonable, lives. W hen legislative efforts a t redistribution 
misfire so significantly th a t they interfere w ith  the  equal rights o f  citizens, 
then  judicial review is appropriate.
A bortion  once again is an  example. A s o f  th is w riting, the  federal 
governm ent is w orking to  develop a  plan for a  m ore ju s t distribution of 
health  care resources. This effort is p a rt o f  the m ore general goal o f cre­
ating the background conditions o f social ju stice .126 A s th is effort contin­
ues, it  should do so in  a  m anner th a t does no t underm ine reasoned 
pluralism . T hus the  general effort to  increase justice  in  the  distribution 
o f  health  care should no t incorporate provisions aim ed a t precluding 
choices about w hich there is reasonable disagreem ent. I f  there  are such 
prohibitions th a t reach the po in t o f  violating rights— as a  prohibition on
123. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
124. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
125. Id. at 315-18.
126. See D aniels, supra note 84.
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abortion funding w ith in  the  context o f a  national health  care program  
w ould do—-judicial review w ould be appropriate.
T o  be sure, problem s rem ain w ith th is R aw lsian approach to  the 
role o f  law  and  judicial review. I t  certainly will no t convince those who 
reject any form  o f reasoned pluralism , o r those w ho th ink  th a t any effort 
to  develop norm ative theory  cannot be justified. I  present it here as an 
illustration  o f how  it is possible to  develop plausible norm ative m odels of 
th e  role o f  law  in  th e  face o f im portan t m oral disagreem ent am ong citi­
zens. Philosophy rem inds us th a t the  enterprise is possible and w orth ­
while, n o t th a t it  is always successful o r complete.
